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1 Moreover, it is neither clear what Adorno"s standards of critique are, nor how he could underwrite them. Hence, his critical project seems to undermine itself: by subjecting everything to critique, he seems to leave himself without a vantage point from which his critique could be justified or acted upon.
2
In this chapter, I will argue that the bulk of these objections can be met. After unpacking the objections (section 1), I will argue that Adorno"s theory, if understood correctly, contains two largely unnoticed resources for an account of normativity.
First, I will suggest that Adorno builds his philosophy around a conception of the bad that suffices to undertake his critical project (section 2). It is best seen as a negativistic critique of modernity. 2 ideal of humanity, which is both compatible with and enriches his negativistic outlook. Adorno"s project emerges as a normative, but explanation-driven form of critical theory (section 3). Finally, I will suggest that this theory also contains practical guidance on how not to live our lives -in short, a minimal, negativistic ethics (section 4).
A brief summary of common objections
Adorno"s theory is a form of radical social critique in that it aims at changing not merely specific aspects of contemporary society, but its whole social structure (of which he speaks in terms of "late capitalism"). Adorno wholeheartedly endorses
Horkheimer"s programmatic statement, according to which critical theory"s objective […] is not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards such abuses as necessarily connected with the entire setup of the social structure. Although it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention or in its objective significance, the better functioning of any element in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions about which it can do nothing. 4 However, the project of criticising the totality of social reality seems to undermine itself, for Adorno"s own diagnosis of this totality seems to leave no room for such a critical project. The first difficulty arises when one asks to whom critical theory is addressed and who would be able to act on it. If Adorno is right about the nature of late capitalism, then the proletariat -for Marx, the revolutionary subject capable of seeing through and opposing capitalism -has been integrated into society in such a that it would be "naive" to think that "unflinching immersion in the object will lead to truth by virtue of the logic of things if only subjective knowledge of the false whole is kept from intruding from the outside, as it were, in the determination of the object". In
Negative Dialectics he adds that it is exactly this subjective knowledge that is required for thought to break out of the social totality. These claims might strike one as problematic in at least two ways. Firstly, one might be surprised by the seemingly moralistic and religious language used by Adorno and Horkheimer, especially given how influenced they were by Nietzsche.
Secondly, one might be sceptical about the purported link between the capitalist social world and the Shoah. Here I can only hint at how Adorno deals with these complex issues. 23 For a start, Adorno"s (and Horkheimer"s) talk of evil reflects the view that the bads we are faced with are so grave that they are beyond any relativistic questioning -they express objective bads and should be acknowledged as such.
However, this does not mean that such talk is meant to cut short critical scrutiny -as appeals to evil often tend to do. Just the opposite: Adorno insists on our facing up to the problem of evil much more than has happened in the past. After Auschwitz, we cannot just go on doing philosophy and living our lives as before. Instead, we have to investigate how it could happen that social, cultural, and moral mechanisms were as powerless as they turned out to be, and adjust, even radically change, our lives and theories according to the findings.
Moreover, Adorno"s use of the term "Böse" ("evil") is less moralistic than it might sound. He also uses other terms -such as Übel (which could be translated as "evil", but also as "ill", "malady" or even "trouble"), Unheil ("calamity", "catastrophe"),
and Grauen ("horror"). These terms are equally evaluatively charged, but seem to be referring to a state of affairs rather than to properties of persons. Crucially, the predicates are primarily and mainly ascribed to our social world. As Adorno writes in Secondly, Adorno holds that our destiny is determined by an economic structure that replicates itself for its own sake rather than for the sake of the human beings that maintain it, with grave consequences for the latter. Many of their material needs remain unmet, while they are subject to an ever increasing expansion of artificial needs, which also contributes to their frustration. In order to survive within 
28
One might be puzzled whether talk of "evil" and "guilt" -which suggests individual responsibility and freedom -is still apt when it is applied to a social world that destines its members to behave in morally problematic ways. According to him, modern society and its thought forms present a grave danger from which one should take flight, and his evaluatively charged language owes a lot to his fear that many will fail to recognise this danger, almost as if they remained in a house despite the fact that it is on fire. should no longer be governed by their own creations (be it the capitalist economic system or state socialism"s vast bureaucracy); that there should be an end to human misery and hunger; that events like those that took place in Auschwitz should never be allowed to happen again; that people should be freed from the enormous pressures that workplaces put them under; that they should even be freed from most of the kind of work which capitalism requires people to undertake; and so on. 29 Nonetheless, such statements should be understood as merely negating the evils of modernity and, indeed, of a long history of domination. 30 As I see it, nothing in these statements commits Adorno to operating with a conception of the good. The key point is thataccording to Adorno -we can identify many of the negative aspects of late capitalism and demand its overcoming simply on the basis of a conception of the bad.
Still, even granting this point, one could object to a purely negativistic strategy by arguing that critique should always provide a positive alternative, not just lament a short-coming. However, Horkheimer and Adorno would maintain that the demand for a detailed blueprint of a better society is impossible to meet and highly inappropriate. 
The resources of critical theory II: humanity
Already in Horkheimer"s seminal essay the pivotal role that a Marxist-Aristotelian conception of humanity plays is striking. He speaks repeatedly of the inhuman nature of late capitalism and laments that the current social structure prevents the constitution of humanity as conscious, self-determining subject. 37 He also suggests that the idea of a free society is immanent in specific human capacities, namely, our capacity to transform nature and in our capacity to think. 38 He seems to hold that both these capacities make possible human self-determination. Nonetheless, he also suggests that this ideal of self-determination can be grasped only negatively. 14 present serves as an index of the fact that this world is an obstacle to human selfdetermination.
This negativistic account of the normative ideal of humanity is even more present in Adorno"s theory. Accusations of inhumanity levelled at late capitalism are a constant threat running through his writings, often as criticism of the way it has turned human beings into objects or appendages of the machine. 39 What might be surprising is that Adorno builds here on elements from Kant"s philosophy. In
Negative Dialectics, he writes:
The "principle of humanity as end in itself" is, despite all ethics of conviction, not something one"s own life. 42 The fact that Adorno uses this term suggests that he, like
Horkheimer, endorses something similar to Kant"s ideal of human self-determination.
However, how can we know that there is an unrealised potential of the sort It also reduces the problem of how we come to know the bad: it is not a transcendent standard, but it is -to come back to Horkheimer"s formulation -"grounded on the misery of the present". 49 In this sense, Adorno presents a sort of internal critique of late capitalism. Still, unlike immanent critiques, it does not require that there is a gap between a social world and the norms used to defend it -his critical standard consists in the objective bads generated by this world and is independent of whether or not these bads are recognised as such by its defenders.
However, even assuming that Adorno"s critical theory could be vindicated in 
Negativistic ethics
In response to this objection we can return to the already mentioned radio discussion between Gehlen and Adorno. Here the latter states:
Ethics is surely nothing else than the attempt to do justice to the obligations, with which the experience of this entangled world present us. Yet this obligation can equally take the form of adjustment and subordination, which you seem to emphasise more, as also the form, which I 21 systematised capitalist world. Perhaps, the constant renewal which capitalism requires at some level to sustain itself will mean that some people will be allowed to think for themselves to a greater extent than most people are destined to do by this social context. Some of these might, perhaps driven by the fact that -according to Adornoour material needs can be never fully integrated, 63 come to some critical insight, and then pass this on to others equally fortunate. However, if at all, this will only happen as an accidental by-product, and, hence, is likely to be limited to a small number of people. Still, they might not be white males from a privileged background that are educated in modernist high culture -for it could turn out that others are more attuned to the experience of negativity and the denial of our potential as human beings. If so, they would turn out to be the keepers of the critical flame.
Conclusion
I started with the objection that Adorno, on the one hand, has to invoke critical standards to make normative claims about what should be avoided (late capitalism), but, on the other hand, cannot underwrite these standards. I have argued that Adorno"s theory can meet this objection because his negativistic conception of humanity provides him with all the reasons, standards, and practical constraints that could justifiably be required of a radical critique of late capitalism. This is not to say that there are no problems remaining, particularly when it comes to the question of who today might be the likely addressee of Adorno"s critical theory. Even if its critical standards can be vindicated, his theory either is reserved for only those few privileged by lucky coincidences or remains a message in a bottle for an unknown addressee in an unknown future.
